Wednesday 2 October 2024

Boris Johnson - I was bluffing on no-deal Brexit

In Boris Johnson's new book, Unleashed, he admits that he was bluffing in 2019 when threatening to leave the EU without a deal. Anyone who is surprised by this wasn't paying attention at the time. I remember having many conversations with desperately worried remainers who believed he would actually do it, as many Brexiteers, some inside parliament, would have preferred. It was always obvious it was just a bluff. You only had to listen to trade experts to realise it, and I never doubted for a second that their voices were coming through loud and clear in Downing Street and across Whitehall, regardless of what Dominic Cummings was saying to the lobby. 

BoJo claims to have had “a curious advantage" because "our partners thought that I might actually be mad enough to do it.” No, they did not. Barnier and his team in Brussels never believed it, which is why they got the better end of the deal. They did think he was a buffoon, just not mad enough to trash the British economy.

The cost of a no-deal Brexit, economically, diplomatically, and politically was way above what Johnson and his government could remotely afford. It was always a non-starter. 

The Times reports:

"In the book, he writes: 'They (the EU) were in an immensely strong position, and they knew it. They wanted to rope-a-dope us, to see how long I could last. I could see that there was only one way to persuade Merkel and Macron to give us a better exit deal. We had to be able to bluff, to show that we were at least willing to do a no-deal Brexit'.”

Well, they certainly succeeded in roping a dope. As the deadline approached, he completely collapsed, accepted the NI protocol, and gave up entirely on fishing quotas.  I note also he is still talking as if he was negotiating with Merkel and Macron and not Michel Barnier, using a clear mandate given to him by all 27 EU member states.

On the NI protocol, Lord Frost is now claiming this was negotiated by Theresa May:

There is some truth in this. Mrs May wanted a deal that didn't need an NI protocol, but Johnson and Frost opposed it. Her draft proposal avoided border controls on the island of Ireland (something she committed to from the outset) by putting them in the only other possible place, the Irish Sea. But it was only ever to be temporary, a backstop to be used if the two sides couldn't reach a full agreement. 

Opponents objected because they feared it would become permanent, as the AG's legal advice in 2018 made clear.

In his book, Johnson describes how he had agreed to the protocol 'without expecting to implement it' even though he didn't want any alignment with the EU at all. It was quite impossible, as he must have been told.  His solution was to tell the public there wouldn't be a sea border, a flat-out lie.

“I also signed because I calculated that if I could get an exit deal, I had a good chance of forcing and winning a general election, and winning a working majority,” he wrote.

“If the EU was still causing difficulties we would ultimately be able to use the might of primary UK legislation to fix the problem because we would be OUT, a free, sovereign and independent country, and it would be up to us to decide what happened in our own borders.”

He has admitted that his plan didn't work but blames the EU for being "unreasonable":

“As 2020 went on it became clear, sadly, that the EU was determined to be unreasonable and to leverage their powers under the protocol, with no regard for the actual objectives of the agreement. ‘Not a kilo of butter will go to Northern Ireland,’ said one EU negotiator — and they had the power to stop it.

“Bacon could no longer get through. Same for Cornish pasties. Same for Marks & Spencer biscuits. It was vicious, and bullying, and totally unnecessary. They didn’t need these checks. There was no difference between English bacon and Irish bacon.

“It was about power, about showing who was boss. The EU was reminding Britain of the cost of a no-deal Brexit and that under the existing withdrawal agreement they had the right — if Britain diverged from the EU — to exercise a growing economic control over a part of the UK.”

And this last point is key. The EU did show who was 'boss' and who held all the cards in 2019. There is no need to remind anyone of the cost of divergence because successive Brexiteer-led Tory leaders couldn't bring themselves to make any serious changes to EU regulations. Even Rees-Mogg couldn't do it.

The divergence that's happening now is passive, as the EU presses on and the UK slips behind, constantly adding to the burden and barriers that our exporters face. This is the problem Labour is trying to address. 

The EU saw through Johnson but is probably having a bit more difficulty with Starmer. The PM is on his way to Brussels to begin the ‘reset ’ in the UK's relationship with the EU, but carrying exactly the same red lines that Frost and Johnson had in 2019. He is clearly not mad, but it must baffle the Europeans to see his approach.

His statement, quoted widely in the media, includes this:

“Better co-operation with the EU will deliver the benefits the British people deserve – securing our borders, keeping us safe and boosting economic growth.”

CityAM add that: "The Prime Minister has confirmed that, under his government, there will be no return to the single market, the customs union or freedom of movement."

It looks crazy doesn't it?  Starmer on the one hand recognises that better cooperation brings benefits but isn't prepared to pay the full price although a majority in the country would like him to. It makes no sense to me and I suspect it will make no sense to Von der Leyen either.