Men like Sir Ivan Rogers and senior civil servants with huge experience were sidelined, sacked, or forced to put forward all sorts of daft ideas dreamt up by a bunch of amateur politicians, who all thought they knew better, desperate to find a solution to the problems thrown up by Brexit. From Brussels, it all looked like a total farce.
Britain seemed to think it could negotiate as if it was still a member even after the decision was taken to leave. There was a mysterious belief that the other member states would in some way ‘help’ Britain to define what Brexit meant and pave the way to a successful existence outside the bloc. If that didn't happen it was the EU 'punishing' Britain. They couldn't conceive the other side would look after its own interests.
Overnight, on 23/24 June everything had changed. The EU moved immediately to protect itself and show others who might be thinking of leaving that life outside was not going to be easy. It was not an unreasonable position, but one that Brexiteers genuinely failed to anticipate.
And anyone who thinks that the present state of the UK-EU relationship was the one originally foreseen and intended by Brexiteers should read De Rynck’s book. The sheer deviousness and effort that British ministers and diplomats and negotiators put in to try and retain all the single market benefits except freedom of movement of people was incredible. They tried everything as if they were haggling in an Arab souk.
Philip Hammond at one point (page 83) when discussing migration said he thought a solution could be found to the mobility issue for specific categories of people and asked, “What does that buy” as if he was horse trading sectors of the single market in exchange for new and unique migration arrangements. If you aren’t embarrassed, by that you should be.
As soon as the Tories are out there will be moves to try and find a closer relationship. Everyone - and I mean everyone - in government was and is perfectly well aware of the damage being done to trade and prosperity.
But one of the least surprising things revealed is about Boris Johnson. In October 2019, he was fast running out of time after trying to pressurise the EU into submission by threatening to walk out without a deal at the end of that month. His back was against the wall and he needed a face-saving way out.
After the 'breakthrough' (when Johnson essentially gave in) with Leo Varadkar in Chester, on Thursday 10 October, teams from the two sides intensively set to work to flesh out the details of what had been outlined, and by the following Wednesday, a day before a crucial EU Council meeting, basically everything had been buttoned up.
But the next morning (17 October) at around 9 am CET, Johnson called Jean Claude Juncker, president of the EU Commission, and voiced one final demand. This was just hours before the Council meeting where the Withdrawal Agreed was to be discussed and accepted by the assembled leaders of the EU27.
According to De Rynck (page 178), he “tried to get an exemption for ‘West-East declarations’ as he [Johnson] called them, the customs exit declarations for goods leaving the EU that apply from Northern Ireland to Great Britain.
He urged Juncker, who was surrounded by colleagues at the time, to drop the checks altogether, presumably fearing the DUP's reaction would be the same as Theresa May had experienced in the most humiliating possible way, two years before.
The Commission president listened to Johnson's demand and then....
"Juncker translated the facial expressions of his protesting collaborators listening to the call. “That was impossible,” he replied, with a cigarette in one hand and the phone in the other. “They are part of the Union’s custom code and your negotiators agreed the code applies in full to Northern Ireland.”
"Johnson hung up the phone, took two hours to reflect on his options, and accepted the terms of the deal in a second call that morning to Juncker at around 11 am."
It's perfectly clear that Johnson knew that meant checks both ways and that he had no other option but to accept it. Despite this, a few days later, on 9 November, he told a group of businessmen in Belfast they could put customs declaration forms “in the bin” because there will be “no barriers of any kind” to trade crossing the Irish Sea.
It was the action of a man who was prepared to say or do anything simply to get through the next few hours regardless of how stupid, disingenuous, or downright dishonest he might look later. This is not the action of a normal human being. He is a psychopath.
Tony Connelly, RTE's Europe correspondent has been reviewing the book and you might like to read his take HERE.