Someone kindly provided links to a couple of EU documents, written this year, one giving background information on EU thinking about the negotiations on external and internal security cooperation after Brexit and another dealing with the complexities of the future trade relationship. They seem to me to be clearer, more transparent and honest about the many problems that Brexit will bring than anything we've provided so far. The security paper is particularly interesting because it reveals in more detail how the UK is going about the negotiations and what the EU think we are trying to get.
Dated May this year, it's mainly about external (military) security (HERE) and gives a fascinating insight into what the EU think our objective is in the negotiations - and why we can't have it. It was written by the Policy Department for External Relations, Directorate General for External Policies of the EU. It's called CSDP (Common Security and defence Policy) after Brexit: The way forward.
The introduction sets the tone:
"Not so very long ago, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU) was considered one of the major sources of tension between London and the other major EU capitals. In response to every new proposal aiming to enhance this much-plagued area of EU action, British grumbling could be heard in the background of every corridor and meeting room in Brussels. Any progress in this area had to be systematically watered down so as not to come up against the UK veto".
"However, since the country announced its intention of leaving the EU, London has been increasingly hinting that it wishes to maintain its role within the CSDP. Over on the other side of the Channel, the attitude towards European defence has never been so constructive, which may seem paradoxical. Because if the United Kingdom actually leaves the single market and customs union, yet remains in the CSDP, it deserves to go down in the annals of the greatest paradoxes in history".
The paper does not believe the UK government's stated position on external security:
"In order to understand the future relationship the British hope to establish with the EU in the field of defence, looking at what they are officially proposing could not be enough. Above all, one must wonder why they suddenly seem to be singing the CSDP’s praises".
"It then picks apart the various public policy papers and speeches by Mrs May and notes we are asking for a deep and special partnership and that what "the British want is to remain involved in the various processes concerning the political decisions made under the CSDP".
"If one were to compare the Brexit negotiations to a game of poker, most of the cards the United Kingdom has got up its sleeve concerning the CSDP can be found in the document of 12 September 2017. To justify the special and unique treatment it is calling for, the United Kingdom is at pains to remind the EU and its members of the assets it can bring to the table. Of the 22 pages that make up the document in question, the first 17 are devoted to listing London’s contribution to global affairs".
After setting out the evolving British position - "The final step in this long process, which led the United Kingdom to define the desired type of cooperation with the EU, was taken on 9 May 2018, when London published a new document specifically dedicated to internal security and defence, called ‘Framework for the UK-EU Security Partnership’ ".
"A Power Point presentation, this text appears to have been published to provide an update on discussions held through to May 2018. As a result, the document can only bring few innovations, given the virtual absence of progress in the negotiations to this date. However, the British appear this time as more realistic, and seem to recognise that access to EU decision-making is far from certain. Thus, much as they did in Munich, they recognise once again that the EU's (and their) autonomy of decision-making has to be respected".
And then under the sub-title "Implicit hopes destined to be dashed" it says:
"The objective of the British, to remain anchored to the CSDP and its policies, is, when all is said and done, very much in the nature of things and very much in their interests. The problem is not so much understanding what they are hoping for, it is understanding how they hope to obtain it. On that point, despite the very many speeches made on the subject by Theresa May’s cabinet and the handful of documents adopted, nothing official has been spelt out. If we turn back the clock a couple of months, however, we might find a few ways forward that are interesting, albeit unofficial".
It goes on to explain the role of Crispin Blunt. "On 26 April 2017, at an inter-parliamentary EU conference in Malta, a few more specifics began to filter through from Westminster. Crispin Blunt, at the time Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee of the British House of Commons and early supporter of Brexit, distributed a document at this conference listing proposals on possible forms of cooperation between the EU and the United Kingdom in the field of defence".
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"Blunt’s text starts by stating clearly that the suggestions presented in his paper are not those of either his government or his party: it is merely a parliamentary contribution to a debate that must get underway, sooner or later. However, the fact [is] that Blunt was the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee of the British Parliament at the time,"
One of Blunt's proposals concerned the PSC (Political and Security Committee) of the EU. "Blunt would like a British representation to have observer status on this committee, ‘to shape, but not make decisions’. He argues that this right should not be granted to other third countries participating in CSDP missions: the aim here would be for an exclusively British prerogative, in view of the special relationship the country would enjoy with the EU and its privileged role in global affairs".
This is how we see ourselves isn't it? An exceptional country that must be given special status above that of all the others. But as the paper points out:
"This generous offer may be necessary, but it is easier said than done. There are many obstacles to be overcome, some of them of a legal nature (as Crispin Blunt should have understood). As is often the case, however, the political obstacles are the hardest of all to get around, particularly when they are hiding differing interests that cannot easily be reconciled. And in the framework of Brexit, the differing and irreconcilable interests between the EU and the United Kingdom are many in number and, as far as the EU is concerned, existential in nature".
Then comes the hammer blow and one I knew was coming a long time ago. This is the point that I made in June (HERE) and July (HERE) and which is front and centre of everything connected with Brexit. Effectively, we want the EU to jointly reach a decision and then come and negotiate with us as if we carry the same status as the whole EU. The paper puts it so:
"The nature of the requests made by London raise a fundamental problem, which makes them hard to swallow. It is an issue that ultimately reflects all of the difficulties in the Euro-British divorce. If, as a third country, the British should remain involved, one way or another, in the decision-making bodies of the CFSP/CSDP, as they are in fact calling to be allowed to do, they will end up with a status that is equivalent to that of the whole EU. Which means that London would carry the same weight as 27 capitals". And "...this is exactly what May meant when she said, in her speech in Florence, that her country wanted to ‘work hand in hand with the European Union, rather than as part of the European Union’.
This is our problem and always has been. This is at the heart of our issues with the EU. We think not that we are part of a community of European nations but that we are equal or even superior to it. As usual the EU are ahead of the game and have again seen us coming. But perhaps all is not lost since the EU still seem to think something can be negotiated but it won't be like we have now, that for one thing is quite clear. We must come to terms with being a third country.
On security matters given our past record of "grumbling" about everything on the Common Security and Defence Policy, it's quite obvious we want to remain influential inside EU bodies, not to help build EU capacity in defence matters, but to block anything we don't agree with.
The paper concludes:
"To summarise, the EU recognises that special dialogue needs to be set in place with the United Kingdom, but goes on to stress that this should not discriminate against other third countries. So, what is the answer? It seems obvious that London should not be able to send observers (or, still less, representatives) to PSC, the Council or anywhere else. Theresa May would appear, furthermore, to have given up on the idea of making an official request to that effect. It should be borne in mind that in the field of the CFSP/CSDP, the structures of the Council work by consensus. The member states virtually never vote within it. If the UK were to send observers, they would automatically end up with almost the same importance as full members. This is not a scenario the EU can consider.
"The possibility of creating bespoke dialogue structures for the United Kingdom, on the other hand, is seen in Brussels as a possible compromise. The problem is, however, to understand the periodicity of this dialogue and the level at which it should be held. On this point, frictions are likely to persist between London and Brussels, as the EU want avoid too many constraints in this context. The decision-making process of a Union of 28 member states is already extremely complicated as it currently stands. If, before every meeting of the Council or Coreper, the member states would have to hold consultations with a British representative and, possibly, representatives of other third countries, EU decision-making would become entirely unmanageable.
"In light of these factors, the shape that the Euro-British relationship may take in defence matters still appears opaque and incomplete. The only certainty that exists at this stage is that the UK will be able to enjoy a special dialogue channel with the EU. This means something and nothing. And the provisions set out in the transition framework do not seem to provide many more clues to this".
I'll look at the trade paper later.
